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BASIS OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from two third-degree felony convictions: discharging a
firearm from a vehicle and causing a riot (R. 144-45). On appeal, defendant
claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence and
failing to bring to the jury's attention evidence that one of the State's witnesses
received a "benefit" for his testimony. Brief of Defendant at 14. This Court has
jurisdiction over appeals from third-degree felony convictions under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

When trial counsel refused to file a motion to suppress, did he

provide substandard performance that prejudiced defendant? To successfully
challenge trial counsel's ineffectiveness, defendant must establish both that his

performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and,
consequently, prejudiced the outcome of the trial. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232,
1239 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685
(1984)).
2.

Given defendant's failure to provide Jeremiah Graham's plea

agreement and criminal record to the appellate court, is his claim that the trial
would have ended in a more favorable result had those items been introduced,
pure speculation? In Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993), the
Utah Supreme Court ruled that "proof of ineffective assistance" must be a
"demonstrable reality" not a speculative matter."
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Any necessary provisions are included in the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
The State charged defendant with committing three crimes: (1) attempted
murder, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(1995); (2) discharging a firearm from a vehicle, third-degree felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1995); and (3) causing a riot, a third-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (1995) (R. 6-8).
2

After a three-day trial, the jury acquitted defendant of the attempted
murder charge but convicted him of the third-degree felony charges (R. 83-86).
Subsequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent indeterminate
prison terms of zero-to-five years and a consecutive indeterminate term of zero to
five years as a firearm enhancement (R. 147).
Statement of Facts
THE DRIVE-BY SHOOTING
At 9:45 in the evening on September 30, 1994, a purple Ford Ranger crept
slowly up B Avenue in Ogden (R. 234). The three men in the cab and five in the
truckbed, including defendant, wore sunglasses and "rags"1 around their heads
to identify themselves as "Crips"2 and to disguise their personal identities (MJ.
They were looking for the house where the "Bloods" were partying and they
planned to raid it and fight their rivals (R. 234; 339). When they found the
party, they told Emmett Johnson, the driver, to turn around at the top of the road,
1

"Rags" are bandanas (R. 237).

2

The term "Crips" refers to one of the two primary gang affiliations
involved in this crime; the other being "Bloods" (R. 237). Defendant and the
other individuals named in this Statement are Crips. The individuals in the truck
were members of two "Crip" sub-gangs: O. V.G. ("One Violent Gangster") and
Eight-Ball Crips (MJ Defendant belongs to the O.V.G. gang (R. 633). The
victims were members of a "Bloods" gang called the West Side Players or West
Side Pirus (R. 237).
3

drive down in front of the home and stop (R. 337). Orlando Naranjo, sitting in
the truckbed, saw defendant pull his gun out of his coat and cock it (R. 337-38).
One of the Crips in the back of the truck started yelling at the Bloods and
throwing up their "signs," hand gestures that identify gang affiliation (id.). The
bloods started running toward the truck, throwing rocks and beer cans when
defendant, one of the Crips in the truck, pulled his gun and started shooting (R.
235; 526). Emmett Johnson looked in his rear view mirror when he heard the
shots and saw gun flashes coming from the defendant's location in the truckbed
(R. 297). Of the eight fired bullets, all of which were 9 millimeter, three went
through a baby's bedroom window in the apartment complex where the party
occurred (R. 252). One passed through the leg of a baby chair (R. 252).
Another hit Pedro Balli, a member of the "Bloods" gang, in the left thigh (R.
280).
Sitting in the back of the truck near defendant, Jeremiah Graham saw him
put the gun back in his jacket after firing (R. 235). Afterward, Johnson
"slammed on the gas" and another gang member told him to drive to the
defendant's aunt's house in Roy (R. 298). During the drive, Jessie Diarte,
another gang member in the truckbed, heard defendant say "I hope I got one"
and saw him put the gun into his waistband (R. 463). When they arrived at the
4

house, defendant told Johnson to remove his neon purple license plate holder
because "the police could identify the truck by that" (R. 301-02). He took the
license plate holder into the house and left his gun under 16-year old Tiffany
Almeida's bed (R. 365). After ten minutes, Johnson drove defendant back to the
Fred Meyer in Ogden where he had earlier parked his car (R. 302). Diarte saw
the license plate holder in the trunk of defendant's car (R. 466).
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR
Approximately two hours later, defendant was sitting in a Taco Maker
restaurant in Ogden when West Side Pirus gang members drove into the parking
lot (R. 612). Three of these "Bloods" came in and started gesturing at defendant
and his friends, yelling "you shot my home boy" and telling them to come
outside (R. 614). Defendant and one of his friends ran to the back of the kitchen
and asked an employee to call the police (R. 526, 614). For the next 15 minutes,
the Bloods waited out in a car and defendant and his friends stayed in the
restaurant (R. 615).
Two of the officers who responded, Officer Tony Huemiller and Officer
Richard Stewart, both knew of the drive-by shooting earlier that evening and
possible O.V.G./West Side Pirus involvement (R. 425, 430). Officer Stewart
was called out as a result of that shooting (R. 416). They also knew that the
5

vehicle they were looking for had a neon license plate cover (R. 417, 431).
When the officers arrived, they asked defendant to come outside where he gave
them the keys to his car and allowed them to search (R. 617). Officer Stewart
searched in the trunk and saw the neon license plate cover (R. 417). Officer
Huemiller, searching the interior of the car, found the unspent bullet on the floor
of the passenger side (R. 418-19, 428). Subsequent tests showed that the bullet
had been chambered in the same weapon as the spent bullet casings found at the
drive-by scene (R. 442).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim of ineffective trial representation should be rejected
because trial counsel properly refused to file a motion to suppress the bullet.
Defendant's challenge to trial counsel's not impeaching Jeremiah Graham also
fails because he does not provide evidence about the plea agreement or Graham's
alleged criminal record. Therefore, defendant's assertion that the trial would
have ended differently had this material been presented is speculation.
The bullet was lawfully found under the plain view doctrine. Defendant
does not contest that he consented to the search and that the bullet was in plain
view. He challenges only the "clearly incriminating" nature of the bullet. When
determining whether evidence is "clearly incriminating," courts look at the
6

circumstances and knowledge available to the officer. The officer knew of the
two-hour old gang-related drive-by shooting, that defendant had in his trunk an
incriminating piece of evidence, i.e., the license plate cover, wanted as part of
that investigation.
Though contesting trial counsel's not introducing into evidence the plea
agreement or Graham's criminal record, defendant does not provide the court
with copies of either item. To this day, no one knows what agreement, if any,
accompanied Graham's plea bargain. Similarly, defendant does not inform of the
status of Graham's criminal record, if any. Given this paucity of information,
defendant's claim that the trial would have ended more favorably had the jury
known of the plea agreement contents and the criminal history is pure
speculation.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE BULLET WAS LEGITIMATELY
SEIZED UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE, A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN
MERITLESS; THEREFORE, COUNSEL'S REFUSAL TO
FILE SUCH A MOTION WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE.

Trial counsel's responsibility to provide effective representation was not
compromised by his refusal to file a motion to suppress the bullet found in
defendant's car. When he saw the bullet, Officer Huemiller knew about the
7

drive-by shooting two hours before, the potential involvement of O.V.G. in that
shooting, and that defendant's trunk contained the license plate cover, described
in the attempt-to-locate regarding the shooting. These circumstances provided
sufficient evidence under the "plain view" doctrine to justify the seizure.
In State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1993), this Court set out
the three-fold test to determine the legality of a seizure under the plain view
doctrine: (1) lawful presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3)
evidence "clearly incriminating.'' Here, neither the first nor second tests are in
dispute. Defendant verbally consented to the search (R. 617). He then gave the
keys to Officer Huemiller and even opened the door for him to search the car
fid.). Located on the floor of the front passenger side, the bullet also was
unquestionably in plain view (R. 418-19; 428). Defendant implicitly concedes
these facts and, consequently, the first two folds of the three-test. The only
dispute is the "clearly incriminating'' nature of the bullet.
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983), the federal supreme court
stated that their decisions "have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfully
engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious
object, they may seize it immediately." Under Brown, an officer may seize an
item if he has probable cause to believe it is associated with criminal activity. Id.
8

at 741-42. The court noted that the probable cause standard is aflexibleand
common-sense one, requiring only that "the facts available to the officer would
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the evidence is
associated with criminal activity. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925). Utah's courts have consistently applied the Brown formula,
although the phrase "clearly incriminating'' somewhat overstates the level of
suspicion needed.3
3

This term calls to mind language the United States Supreme Court
used in the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466
(1971). There, the plurality stated that it must be "immediately apparent" to the
police that the items seized evidence a crime. Id. The majority in Brown
specifically rejected this term, calling it an "unhappy choice of words since it can
be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory
character of evidence is necessary for an application of the 'plain view'
doctrine."' Brown, 460 U.S. at 741. The phrase originated in Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6 (1982) where the high court stated that the plain view
"exception ... permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is
incriminating evidence...."
This language should not be seen as a minimum requirement because the
evidence seized in that case was marijuana, evidence clearly incriminating per se.
Unfortunately, the use of the term as shorthand also implies the same "high
degree of certainty" as "immediately apparent" in Coolidge. According to
Brown, a "'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is
involved is all that is required." Id. at 742. In any event, in Utah jurisprudence,
the phrase "clearly incriminating" is an empty vessel. The courts have always
defined the phrase in probable cause terminology, as Brown demands. State v.
Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1985) ("[T]he clearly incriminating
requirement also mandates that officers have probable cause to associate the
9

Looked at from the viewpoint of Officer Huemiller,4 his opinion that the
bullet evidenced criminal activity was reasonable: (1) a drive-by shooting had
occurred two hours before that may have involved O.V.G. and defendant was a
member of O.V.G.; (2) the bullets used in the shooting were 9 millimeter and the
bullet on the defendant's car floor was 9 millimeter; (3) the attempt-to-locate
message said that a neon purple license plate cover was on the suspect vehicle
and there was a neon purple license plate cover in defendant's trunk; (4) the
people shot at in the drive-by were members of West-Side Pirus; (6) at
defendant's request, the police were called to Taco Maker because of a possible
disturbance between O.V.G. and West Side Pirus.
Because of these circumstances, this case is unlike both State v. Chapman,
295 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah July 19, 1995)5 and Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 210.
The Chapman court did not even discuss the "plain view" doctrine, concentrating
property to be seized with criminal activity.").
4

As noted in Brown, probable cause determinations always have been
looked at from the reasonable law enforcement officer's perspective: "[E]vidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id.
at 742 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
5

Defendant's brief gives the citation to the unamended version of this
case. However, the amendment in the new opinion is not relevant to the
circumstances here.
10

instead on the permissible scope of detention. Chapman, 295 Utah Adv. Rep. at
22-23.
In Gallegos, the state supreme court decided that evidence seized
purportedly under the plain view doctrine was unlawfully taken because it was
not incriminating at all. Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 210. There, police saw a VCR
and TV while they were lawfully conducting a warrant search for drugs.
Thinking that these items might be stolen, the officers began an independent
investigation and seized them after concluding that Gallegos had not "rented"
them. Id. at 208. The supreme court rejected the State's attempt to justify the
seizure under the plain view doctrine. At no time, the supreme court stated, did
the officers have probable cause to believe the TV and VCR were stolen;
therefore, the "clearly incriminating" part of the test could not be met. Id.
Defendant's attempt to fit this case into the Gallegos category by saying "[t]here
is nothing inherently illegal about having a bullet in a car" is misplaced. Officer
Huemiller's seizure of the bullet was not grounded on the basis that the bullet was
contraband but because it was evidence of criminal activity, i.e., the drive-by
shooting that had occurred just shortly before.
Had trial counsel brought a motion to suppress the bullet, it would have
been without merit and rejected. The constitution does not require any counsel to
11

bring frivolous or meritless motions. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109
(Utah 1983). Therefore, bringing a motion to suppress was not a necessary
component of constitutionally adequate representation and defendant's sixth
amendment claim must fail on this ground. Because defendant's challenge does
not satisfy the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984)
test, it is not technically necessary to examine potential prejudice. State v.
McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah App. 1994) (trial counsel's failure to
advise client of potential deportation was not deficient; therefore, unnecessary to
examine prejudice). Nevertheless, the bullet actually appeared to be a more
important part of the police investigation, i.e., building the case, than of the trial.
Including Graham's written statement, four participants of the drive-by shooting
testified that defendant was the shooter. This evidence alone would have justified
the conviction.
H.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED
THIS COURT WITH A COPY OF JEREMIAH
GRAHAM'S CRIMINAL RECORD OR EVIDENCE
ABOUT HIS PLEA AGREEMENT, HIS
ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL WOULD HAVE
ENDED DIFFERENTLY HAD THEY BEEN
INTRODUCED IS SPECULATIVE AND DOES
NOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVENESS.
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Defendant claims his trial counsel should have introduced evidence of
Jeremiah Graham's criminal record and his plea bargain. Graham, a participant
in the drive-by shooting, sat in the back of the truck with defendant. Shortly
after the incident, he temporarily repented of his crime, confessed his
involvement and named defendant as the gunman in a written statement (R. 23336). At trial, however, Graham denied everything: the drive-by shooting, the
statement, his signature on the statement, any agreement to testify in exchange
for his statement, and defendant's membership in O.V.G. (R. 224-25).
Because of this denial, the State's direct examination was short and limited
in focus. Consequently, trial counsel's cross-examination was also short and
even more limited. On appeal, defendant asserts that trial counsel failed to
"properly request Mr. Graham's criminal record" and "interview Mr. Graham to
determine that he had received a plea bargain in exchange for testimony against
[defendant]." Brief of Defendant at 15-16. However, defendant never
documents these assertions, nor does he provide the Court with copies either of
the plea agreement or the criminal record. Therefore, defendant's appellate
challenges are nothing more than speculation and cannot lay a foundation for an
ineffectiveness challenge. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)
("On many occasions, mis court has reiterated that proof of ineffective assistance
13

of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.").
For this reason, State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185 (Utah 1990) does not
support defendant's position. Templin brought out evidence of his trial counsel's
negligence in a hearing on a motion for new trial. Id. Defendant never
requested such a hearing nor has he asked for one under rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Because of this failure, he cannot establish what
investigation trial counsel actually carried out or what the results of a hypothetical
investigation would have been.
In any event, Graham's statement was cumulative. Impeaching evidence
discrediting it would not have substantially detracted from the total evidence
against defendant. Graham was only one of four co-gang members who testified
against defendant. Their statements on the stand were substantially the same;
indeed, Jesse Diarte's, Orlando Naranjo's and Emmett Johnson's testimony were
more damning (R. 463; R. 337-38; R. 297-302). Due to the overwhelming
nature of this testimony, the value of defendant's hypothesized impeachment
would most likely have a negligible effect on the jury's deliberation. Thus, the
decision not to attempt impeachment may have been a legitimate, strategic one on
the counsel's part.

14

When a trial counsel is in the midst of trial, he or she prioritize goals and
objectives. The very words "strategy" and "tactics," used consistently to
describe counsel's discretionary decisions in ineffectiveness cases, call to mind a
military analogy which may be helpful to further develop. In a military battle, a
soldier may find he is being shot at from several different directions
simultaneously. Obligated to quickly evaluate options, he chooses to concentrate
his response on what he believes is the most dangerous combatant. Similarly,
trial counsel here may simply have chosen to devote his time and resources on
attacking what he believed to be the prosecution's most powerful witnesses. In
this light, it is interesting to note defendant's apparent concession that trial
counsel's impeachment and cross-examination of Naranjo and Diarte was proper.
Brief of Defendant at 14-15. This supports the already present presumption that
trial counsel's actions were part of a legitimate design. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1225 (Utah 1983) ("[I]f the challenged act or omission might be considered
sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of
counsel."); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66 (Utah App. 1993) ("[T]his
court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however
flawed those choices might appear in retrospect.").

15

The relatively scant value of impeaching Graham's written statement also
affects the prejudice analysis. Because of the number of the eyewitnesses and the
strength of their combined testimomes, adding the hypothetical impeachment
most likely would not change the result of the jury's deliberations. Thus, on
appeal, defendant's challenge to his trial counsel's decision not to attack
Graham's credibility survives neither prong of the Strickland test.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ttflday of September 1996
JAN GRAHAM

UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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